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GIVING CONSUMERS A LEG TO STAND ON: 
FINDING PLAINTIFFS A LEGISLATIVE 
SOLUTION TO THE BARRIER FROM FEDERAL 
COURTS IN DATA SECURITY BREACH SUITS 
Patricia Cave+ 
For hackers, “[t]he holy grail . . . is the account information.”1  In recent 
years, the prevalence of data security breaches has increased, culminating in 
one of the largest breaches in history, which impacted over seventy-seven 
million users.2  The proliferation of smart-phones and tablet devices has 
promoted a virtual marketplace that has contributed to the reality where 
consumers conduct many aspects of their lives solely through the internet.3  In 
a world in which consumers perform countless online transactions, ranging 
from banking to purchasing holiday gifts through online retailers such as 
Amazon.com, data breaches raise questions about the security of names, social 
security numbers, addresses, and other personal information collected by 
companies.4  Each year security breaches and security-breach notification laws 
cost businesses billions of dollars.5  Security breaches also undermine 
consumer confidence, resulting in further harm to the economy.6 
In 2011, identity theft ranked as the most frequent consumer complaint 
submitted to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for the twelfth year in a 
                                                 
 + J.D. and Institute for Communications Law Studies Certificate Candidate, May 2014, Catholic 
University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S., 2011, Virginia Polytehnic Institute and 
State University.  The author wishes to thank her mother for providing the inspiration to always 
work toward her goals; her siblings for their unending friendship; and her friends for their 
unwavering support. 
 1. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, MasterCard and Visa Investigate Data 
Breach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at B1. 
 2. Liana B. Baker & Jim Finkle, Sony Playstation Suffers Massive Data Breach, REUTERS, 
Apr. 26, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE73P6WB20110426; 
Nick Bilton & Brian Stelter, Sony Says PlayStation Hacker Got Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2011, at B1. 
 3. See, e.g., Smartphones: Changing the Way Businesspeople Work and Live, 
RINGCENTRAL (Apr. 10, 2012), http://blog.ringcentral.com/2010/04/smartphones-changing-the 
-way-business-professionals-work-and-live.html (noting the increasing role such devices are 
playing in the personal and professional lives of many). 
 4. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age 
of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1154–55 (1997) (discussing the increased use of 
computers and the internet and the resulting concerns about loss of personal information and 
privacy). 
 5. Eduardo M. Gonzalez, Comment, The New Arizona Data Security Breach Law: A Step 
in the Right Direction, But Unlikely to Prevent Identity Theft or Compensate Consumers, 40 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1349, 1355 (2008) (noting an estimated cost of $48 billion per year to the retail 
sector alone). 
 6. Id. 
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row.7  Identity thieves use personal information in a variety of ways, including 
opening a new line of credit in the victim’s name, opening fraudulent banking 
accounts, making purchases using the victim’s existing credit card or bank 
account, improperly using social security numbers to apply for jobs, and 
securing cable, satellite, or wireless cell phone services.8  Identity theft arising 
out of data security breaches amounted to 1.7% of claims filed with the FTC in 
2011.9  Although the percentage appears low, the FTC’s inclusion of the 
category is itself significant.  Previously, identify theft due to data breaches 
was not separately identified; thus the FTC’s recognition demonstrates a 
growing trend of recognizing the issue.10 
In addition to the rarely read terms-of-use agreements and the lack of 
consumer awareness of exactly how much personal information is aggregated, 
shared, and stored by companies, consumers face numerous barriers to 
bringing a successful claim against a company that exposes their information.11  
The FTC, an independent regulatory agency charged with preventing unfair or 
deceptive practices affecting consumers, establishes rules and regulations and 
                                                 
 7. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR  
JANUARY – DECEMBER 2011, at 3 (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel 
-annual-reports/sentinel-cy2011.pdf (finding that fifteen percent of complaints involved identity 
thefts). 
 8. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 2007, at 1, 7–8, 
available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/Aftermath_2007_20080529v2_1. 
pdf.  Identity theft victims face many actual and psychological challenges including the inability 
to clear negative credit records, an increase in insurance and credit card rates, criminal arrest 
warrants improperly issued for the innocent victim resulting from financial or other crimes 
committed by the identity thief, and severe negative emotional impacts.  See Press Release, 
Identity Theft Resource Center, ITRC’s 5th Annual Aftermath Study Released: An Analysis of 
Identity Theft Through the Victim’s Eyes (June 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/m_press/Identity_Theft_The_Aftermath_2007.shtm
l. 
 9. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 12. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Derek A. Bishop, Note, No Harm No Foul: Limits on Damages Awards for 
Individuals Subject to a Data Breach, 4 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 12, 23 (2008) (discussing 
the challenges plaintiffs face in bringing data breach suits based on negligent database 
management); see also Kenneth K. Dort, Recent Trends in Cyberspace Law: Data Security and 
Privacy, in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 139 (2012), available at 
2012 WL 2244546, at *9 (stating that “courts have generally not provided relief . . . unless the 
plaintiff is able to demonstrate a cognizable harm,” such as financial damage); Timothy H. 
Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation – A Tough Road for Plaintiffs, 55 BOS. B.J. 27,  
27–28 (2011) (acknowledging that “courts have been reluctant to allow [data breach] litigation to 
proceed past the earliest stages”); Amanda Blades, Note, Can’t Get No Satisfaction: The 
Consequences of Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007) for Potential 
Victims of Identity Theft, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 509, 511 (2009) (noting that “courts have refused to 
recognize the compromising of personal information as a cognizable injury without the actual 
fraudulent use of the that information”). 
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seeks monetary redress and relief for conduct that is injurious to consumers.12  
The FTC has not yet adopted data privacy regulations addressing liability in 
data security breach situations.13 
Congress has neither provided the FTC with authority to promulgate data 
security regulations, nor has it passed any comprehensive data privacy 
legislation imposing standards on all private entities, although many bills have 
been proposed in recent years.14  However, Congress has passed a range of 
laws imposing privacy requirements on public and private entities that manage, 
aggregate, and share consumer information.15  Meanwhile, states have 
addressed the issue individually, passing data privacy legislation on a 
piecemeal basis.16  These efforts primarily focus on notification statutes 
requiring companies to follow certain procedures after discovering a data 
breach.17  The combination of a lack of uniform statutory guidance about 
                                                 
 12. See About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 13. See Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach 
Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 170 (2008) (stating that 
“[n]o guidelines exist under which the Commission will act or refrain from acting if a data 
security breach occurs”). 
 14. See, e.g., Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2011, S. 1535, 
112th Cong. (2011) (providing notice and procedural requirements for entities that maintain 
databases of personal information, permitting federal and state authorities to impose civil 
penalties for violations, and creating causes of action for violations of the statute); Data Breach 
Notification Act of 2011, S. 1408, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring disclosure of security breaches); 
Cyber-Security Enhancement and Consumer Data Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 5318, 109th 
Cong. (2006) (imposing a $50,000 fine for each day an individual fails to provide notice of a 
major security breach, up to one million dollars); Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA), 
H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2005) (requiring covered entities to establish various security policies, 
such as identifying an individual responsible for overseeing data security); Financial Data 
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2005) (amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
to require improved protections for financial data); Personal Data Privacy Security Act of 2005, 
S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005) (requiring commercial entities to implement a comprehensive data 
privacy and security program for protecting sensitive personally identifiable information and 
notifying all U.S. residents whose personal information has been accessed); Identity Theft 
Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th  Cong. (2005) (requiring covered entities to develop and 
implement a program for security of sensitive personal information including administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards); Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 1326, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (requiring minimum data security and notification procedures). 
 15. See, e.g., Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1681 (2006), Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 
(2006); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 680–6809 (2006); CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 
U.S.C. § 7701 (2006); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510  
–2522 (2006); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006 & Supp. 
2011). 
 16. See Vincent Serpico, Denise Landers & Damon A. Terrill, Making Sense of U.S. State 
Data Privacy Laws, 119 BANKING L.J. 462, 463 (2002). 
 17. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2012) (requiring notification of breach); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (Supp. 2012) (requiring notification and enforcement by the attorney 
general); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-101 to -108 (2011) (requiring individuals and businesses to 
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database management obligations and limited remedies available to consumers, 
results in varied court decisions as to whether a consumer whose account 
information has been exposed to an unauthorized third-party, but has not yet 
been used fraudulently, has standing to bring a claim.18 
Some courts consider the mere increased risk of identity theft as too 
hypothetical or conjectural to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement 
                                                                                                                 
protect sensitive personal information and promptly disclose security breaches); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 6-1-716 (2012) (requiring notification of breach); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 36a-701b (West 2011) (requiring notification of breach and stating that noncompliance 
constitutes an unfair trade practice punishable by the attorney general); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,  
§ 101–104 (2005 & Supp. 2012) (requiring notification of breach and enforcement by the attorney 
general); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2006) (requiring notification of breach without unreasonable 
delay and establishing civil penalties for non-compliance up to $500,000); GA. CODE ANN.  
§§ 10-1-912 (2009) (requiring notification of breach to consumers and, in the case of a breach 
affecting more than ten thousand residents, requiring notification to consumer reporting 
agencies); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.2 (West Supp. 2012) (requiring notification of breach and 
giving the attorney general authority to recoup damages on behalf of injured parties); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071–77 (2012) (requiring notification of breach); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, § 1348 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (requiring notification of breach); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 93H, §§ 2–6 (West Supp. 2012) (imposing regulations to safeguard state residents’ personal 
information and requiring notification of breach requirements subject to attorney general action in 
case of violations); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2011) (requiring notification of breach and 
imposing a civil fine or imprisonment for violations); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2012) 
(requiring notification of breach to residents and consumer reporting agencies when a thousand or 
more people are affected by a security breach); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2011) (requiring 
notification of breach and prohibiting a private cause of action unless that individual is in fact 
injured because the violation); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2011) (requiring notification of 
breach to consumers and reporting agencies without unreasonable delay and granting the attorney 
general exclusive authority to bring an action for violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (Supp. 2012) (requiring notification of 
breach and providing injured South Carolinian the opportunity to bring an action to seek actual 
damages, an injunction to enforce compliance, and to recover attorney’s fees); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 9, § 2435 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (requiring notification of data security breach and giving the 
attorney general and the state’s attorney exclusive authority to enforce the requirements); WIS. 
STAT. § 134.98 (2009) (requiring notice in cases of security breach); D.C. CODE § 28-3852 
(2011) (requiring notification of breach to a resident whose personal information was 
compromised and permitting injured residents to collect actual damages, not including pain and 
suffering).  A few states have already enacted comprehensive data protection statutes concerning 
the personal information of their residents.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (West 2009) 
(imposing a duty on businesses to take reasonable care in handling consumers’ personal 
identification information). 
 18. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
plaintiff had standing after a laptop containing unencrypted personal information was stolen); 
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding standing on the basis 
of increased risk of future harm).  But see Katz v. Pershing, L.L.C., 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 
2012) (holding that a plaintiff could not satisfy Article III’s standing requirement because she did 
not allege actual or impending injury); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that alleged risk of future harm is insufficient to establish standing), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 2395 (2012). 
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that plaintiffs suffer concrete injury-in-fact.19  Other courts, however, show a 
willingness to consider standing as a low threshold requirement.20  Courts 
willing to acknowledge the increased threat of identity theft have analogized 
the facts to cases involving defective medical devices, toxic substance 
exposure, and environmental injury.21  However, plaintiffs must also allege 
actual, compensable damages in claims under common law theories of 
negligence, emotional distress, or breach of contract.22  These suits are likely to 
be, and have been, dismissed for failure to state a claim on the premise that the 
plaintiff’s injury is not compensable under state law despite conquering the 
initial standing hurdle.23 
This Comment discusses potential solutions that would allow plaintiffs to 
successfully bring claims centered on data security breaches in federal court.  
The Comment begins by considering standing as a requirement imposed by 
Article III of the Constitution and reviews the inconsistencies of data breach 
standing jurisprudence in the various courts of appeals.  Next, it discusses the 
courts’ rationales for granting or denying standing and analyzes plaintiffs’ 
subsequent hurdle of proving compensable injury for claims based on common 
law theories of negligence and breach of contract.  Next, this Comment 
considers the inadequacy of already-enacted federal and state legislation in the 
area of data privacy.  Finally, this Comment concludes that the most 
appropriate solution to the issue presented is for Congress to debate and adopt 
comprehensive data privacy legislation.  Any legislation should provide both 
governmental enforcement and a private cause of action for consumers whose 
information has been exposed to an unauthorized third-party. 
                                                 
 19. See Katz, 672 F.3d at 80; Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43; Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon 
Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 2643307 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (concluding 
that plaintiffs’ “future-oriented, hypothetical, and conjectural” claims were insufficient to 
establish standing); Allison v. Aetna, Inc., Civ. A. No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (holding that an allegedly heightened risk of identity theft is too speculative to 
confer standing); Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(emphasizing the need for immediate threat of harm to confer standing). 
 20. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634. 
 21. See id. at 634 n.3; see also Blades, supra note 11, at 513–18 (examining the comparison 
between medical monitoring and identity theft protection). 
 22. See Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that 
under Maine negligence law, damages must be reasonably foreseeable); Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 
639 (noting that actual injury is required to recover in the absence of statutory law); Ruiz v. Gap, 
Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that state law required the claim to be 
dismissed for failure to allege appreciable harm), aff’d, 380 F.. App’x. 689 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Bishop, supra note 11, at 23 (discussing plaintiffs’ difficulty in alleging actual compensable 
damages in data breach suits). 
 23. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 639 (stating that “[w]ithout more than allegations of increased risk 
of future identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm that the law is prepared to 
remedy”); Ruiz, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (dismissing a job applicant’s claim against a prospective 
employer because California negligence law required more than an increased risk of future 
identity theft to allege a compensable injury). 
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I.  CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF STANDING PROVIDE A BACKDROP 
FOR DATA SECURITY 
A.  Standing Limits the Power of the Judiciaryin Order to Respect Separation 
of Powers and Judicial Efficiency 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution articulates the power of the federal 
judiciary.24  Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only hear 
actual, live “cases and controversies.”25  In addition to the other justiciability 
doctrines of mootness,26 ripeness,27 and political question,28 standing ensures 
that the proper plaintiff brings a matter to court for adjudication.29 
Standing is “built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of 
powers.”30  Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote that “the law of standing roughly 
restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals 
and minorities against . . . the majority, and excludes them from  
. . . prescribing how the other two branches should function in order to serve 
the interest of the majority itself.”31  The standing doctrine assists in 
determining the role of the judiciary.32  Courts have declined to expand their 
                                                 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 25. Id. § 2. 
 26. The mootness doctrine requires that an actual controversy exist during the entire judicial 
review rather, and not only, at the time the suit is filed.  See Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 375 (1974).  See generally ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (4th ed. 2011). 
 27. The ripeness doctrine attempts to avoid premature adjudication of disputes by reviewing 
“‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and the ‘hardship to the parties of withholding 
court consideration.’”  Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
153, 161 (1987) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 104–14. 
 28. The political question doctrine requires a determination on whether a matter has been 
committed by the Constitution to the political branches of government.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 210 (1962); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 130–51. 
 29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 59. 
 30. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 
n.3 (1996) (acknowledging a “separation-of-powers component” to the standing doctrine and that 
actual injury is a requirement to prevent frivolous claims from being pursued in the judicial 
system). 
 31. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983). 
 32. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 60; see also Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability 
to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 169–70 (2011) (stating that standing prevents 
courts from hearing cases better left to the political branches and that standing can be used 
effectively to prevent improper efforts to control the Executive Branch); William Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (stating that the purposes of the doctrine of 
standing include “preventing the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy 
-making functions of the popularly elected branches); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. 
2013] Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts 771 
own jurisdiction beyond live cases and controversies to avoid issuing advisory 
opinions and to prevent exceeding the judicial branch’s political capacity by 
encroaching on the powers of the other branches of government.33 
The architects of the federal judiciary created the standing requirement to 
increase judicial efficiency by ensuring that the plaintiff bringing a suit is 
personally invested in or affected by the adjudication.34  Justice William 
Brennan emphasized in Baker v. Carr that a plaintiff must allege “such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so 
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”35  While 
courts do not consider the merits of a claim at the early stage of analysis 
associated with a justiciability determination,36 “[t]he essence of a true 
standing question is . . . [whether] the plaintiff ha[s] a legal right to judicial 
enforcement of an asserted legal duty,” a question that can be and has been 
interpreted as requiring an evaluation of the merits.37  Courts should dismiss 
the suit “[i]f the party bringing the litigation is not the appropriate party.”38  
Some critics of the Court’s standing jurisprudence consider the use of standing 
as a way to avoid controversial cases by disposing of a claim in the name of 
judicial efficiency and separation of powers.39 
                                                                                                                 
REV. 447, 519–20 (1994) (arguing that a restrictive standing doctrine with a high constitutional 
bar plays an important, and even essential, role in managing judicial functions under Article III.). 
 33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 60; Pushaw, supra note 32, at 512. 
 34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 59–60. 
 35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
 36. Id. at 196–98. 
 37. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 229. 
 38. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING 
AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 115–16 (6th ed. 2007). 
 39. See LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS 
HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 1 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court uses standing as a way to dispense of “socially sensitive” cases, particularly race-centered 
cases); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 635, 639–42 (1985) (criticizing the Burger Court for calling for the dismissal of cases 
without meaningful examination of the plaintiff’s interests, particularly in cases brought by 
minorities by adjusting the requirements of the standing analysis); Mark V. Tushnet, The New 
Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); see also City of 
L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112–13 (1983) (holding that an African-American man, who had 
been nearly knocked unconscious as a result of a choke-hold administered by a Los Angeles 
Police Department officer, lacked standing to sue for injunctive relief because he could not show 
that it would occur again); Mark Starr & Janet Huck, The Chokehold Controversy, NEWSWEEK, 
May 24, 1982, at 32 (examining the race component in the Lyons decision).  See generally Daniel 
E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of 
the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 610–11 (2010) (analyzing decisions 
throughout history using data processing and concluding that standing is used to insulate 
administrative agencies from judicial review). 
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1.  Understanding Constitutional Standing 
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution restricts federal court 
jurisdiction to specific “cases” or “controversies.”40  With little guidance from 
the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has determined that standing to 
bring a claim requires three essential elements.41  First, the plaintiff must have 
“suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest.”42  
The injury complained of must be “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’”43  Second, a plaintiff’s claim must arise from an injury that 
“fairly can be traced to the challenged action of a defendant.”44  Third, a 
favorable court decision must be able to redress the plaintiff’s injury.45  The 
plaintiff bears the burden to establish all three elements.46   The issue of 
standing, a question of subject matter jurisdiction, can be raised by the parties 
or sua sponte by the court at any point during the litigation.47  For an injury to 
sufficiently confer standing in a civil suit, the plaintiff must personally suffer 
the injury in question.48  It is “clear that injuries to common law, constitutional, 
and statutory rights are sufficient” to confer standing on a plaintiff.49 
2.  Differentiating Statutory Standing 
In addition to the common law and constitutionally based causes of action, 
“Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement, . . . which can confer 
standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially 
cognizable injury [without the] statute.”50  Often, Congress integrates a private 
right of action against a violator of a statute within the statute’s language.51  
                                                 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 41. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102). 
 44. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976). 
 45. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38). 
 46. Id. 
 47. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 62.  See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 
629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 48. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565–68 (denying standing because the plaintiffs could not show that 
the failure to preserve endangered species abroad would cause the plaintiffs personal harm); see 
also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109–10 (holding that a man lacked a personalized injury for which to seek 
an injunction against the Los Angles Police Department’s use of the chokehold because it was 
uncertain that this particular plaintiff would be injured in the future by another chokehold). 
 49. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 69. 
 50. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975); see also Tushnet, supra note 39, at 153 
(stating that “legislators could create new interests, the violation of which would give rise to 
standing.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (holding that 
Congress had the authority to create the right to information about political committees, a 
violation of which was sufficient to confer standing on any person); Trafficante v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 211 (1972) (recognizing that a white woman had standing because an 
apartment complex owner’s discrimination against black applicants deprived her of a right to be 
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The Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, however, struck down a provision 
of the Endangered Species Act permitting anyone to file suit against a violator 
of the Act as an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to “transfer [power to 
execute the law] from the President to the courts,” and a violation of Article 
III’s case or controversy requirement.52  In contrast to Lujan in which the 
statute did not require the plaintiff to have been “affected” by a statutory 
violation, when the legislature provides clear evidence of its intent to grant 
persons affected by violations of a statute the right to sue, the act of Congress 
comports with Article III standing principles.53  When a court considers 
whether statutory standing exists, it considers whether the particular plaintiff 
can properly avail herself of the private right of action created by the statute.54  
Statutory standing essentially provides a route to federal court by “elevat[ing] 
injuries that were not previously legally cognizable to the status of legally 
enforceable rights.”55 
Various types of injuries satisfy standing.56  The Court acknowledged that 
aesthetic harm can be sufficient to confer standing.57  While willing to 
recognize standing in some cases of economic or aesthetic harm, the Court is 
unwilling to recognize standing for other proposed injuries, such as marital 
happiness.58  With a lack of guiding principles in standing jurisprudence, the 
application of the doctrine has often depended on the type of injury suffered.  
This confusion has led to the current split in federal courts on whether 
plaintiffs in data security breach suits have suffered an injury sufficient to 
confer Article III standing.59 
                                                                                                                 
free from the adverse consequences of racial discrimination created by the Civil Rights Act of 
1968). 
 52. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579. 
 53. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 70–71 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (finding that the Clean Water Act’s 
citizen suit provision embodies the constitutional requirement of injury in the preliminary 
determination of standing).  The Clean Water Act provides that “any citizen” may bring suit for 
violations of the Act.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (2006).  The Act defines “citizen” as “a person or 
persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.”  Id. 
 54. Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 
91 (2009). 
 55. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1228 
(1993). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 
U.S. 669, 686–89 (1973) (holding that a claim of an aesthetic or environmental harm is sufficient 
to constitute an injury for Article III standing purposes). 
 57. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63. 
 58. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984) (denying stigmatization caused 
by the government’s discriminatory taxation policy of providing tax exemptions to private 
schools that used racially discriminatory practices as a sufficient injury for standing); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 128 (1973) (refusing to acknowledge possible future harm to marital 
happiness as sufficient to confer Article III standing). 
 59. Compare Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (denying standing to a 
plaintiff whose personal information was inadvertently disclosed), and Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 
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B.  Courts Disagree on Whether Data Breach Suit Plaintiffs Have Suffered 
Actual or Imminent Harm 
When the personal information exposed in a data breach has not yet been 
used fraudulently, plaintiffs face an uphill battle in demonstrating an injury 
sufficient for Article III standing.60  While courts generally have refused to 
recognize the increased threat of identity theft as a cognizable injury for 
standing purposes, a few have recognized that, in certain circumstances, the 
lack of fraudulent use is not an absolute bar to a claim.61 
1.  Increased Threat of Future Harm Caused by the Data Breach Is 
Sufficient to Confer Article III Standing in Some Courts 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have found Article III 
standing when proof exists that an unauthorized third-party accessed the 
plaintiff’s personal information, even if the personal information has not yet 
been used fraudulently.62  In reaching their conclusions, these courts have 
endorsed the view that alleging future harm can be sufficient for standing if 
there is “danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged 
. . . conduct and the injury or threat of injury is both real and immediate, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”63  To determine whether a consumer faces a risk 
of future harm in the form of identity theft after a data breach exposes their 
                                                                                                                 
664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding potential harm from data breaches too conjectural to 
confer standing), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012), with Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the data breaches presented a “credible threat of real and 
immediate harm”), and Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(recognizing an increased risk of future harm as sufficient for standing). 
 60. Dort, supra note 11, at *10 (arguing that the Information Revolution presents a 
challenge that must be resolved to permit businesses to grow while protecting consumers); 
Madden, supra note 11, at 27–28; Jacob W. Schneider, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative 
Approaches to Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 288 
(2009) (stating that an uphill battle results for consumers who are unable to show damages); 
Bishop, supra note 11, at 23 (acknowledging that the “courts have required that the [personal] 
information be used fraudulently”); Blades, supra note 11, at 511 (discussing the standing hurdle 
faced by plaintiffs in data breach suits and how Pisciotta should be overturned on policy 
considerations). 
 61. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143; Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634; see also Gary Zhao, Claridge v. 
RockYou, Inc.: “Value” Inherent in Consumers’ Personally Identifiable Information, 2011-SEP 
BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1 (2011) (commenting about the tendency for courts to dismiss consumer suits 
for failure to meet the injury-in-fact requirement of standing, among other hurdles). 
 62. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (finding that the plaintiff adequately alleged Article III 
standing by alleging future harm as a result of the data breach); Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 (“[T]he 
injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the 
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, 
absent the defendant’s actions”). 
 63. Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting City of 
L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). 
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personal information, these courts have relied on the reasoning in defective 
medical device, toxic substance exposure, and environmental injury cases.64 
In Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, the Seventh Circuit recognized that in 
circumstances where an unauthorized third-party accesses the information 
through a “sophisticated, intentional and malicious” manner, a perceived 
increased risk of identity theft sufficiently establishes standing.65  In Pisciotta, 
the hosting facility of a marketing website used for completing online 
applications for banking services suffered a security breach.66  Plaintiffs 
brought a class action suit against the marketing website and hosting service 
alleging negligence and breach of contract claims.67  After considering the 
rationales of its sister courts in dismissing cases with similar facts, the Seventh 
Circuit was satisfied that “a threat of future harm or . . . an act which harms the 
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm” is sufficient to confer 
standing when the increase in risk was caused by the defendant’s actions.68  
Once a plaintiff’s level of injury reaches the increased risk of harm threshold, 
standing has been met.69 
Similarly, in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that the 
theft of a laptop computer from a Starbucks containing unencrypted personal 
data of Starbucks employees was a “credible threat of real and immediate 
harm.”70  The court hypothesized that its conclusion might be different  
                                                 
 64. As data security breach suits are a relatively new phenomenon, it is helpful to apply the 
rationale from these similar fields in deciding standing issues.  See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632, 
634.  The similarity of medical devices, toxic substances, environmental injury, and data breach 
cases arises from a plaintiff’s increased risk of harm resulting from a defendant’s action.  Some 
courts, however, have refrained from expanding the scope of what constitutes an injury for 
purposes of standing because toxic tort and defective medical device cases “‘directly involve 
human health and safety,’ while ‘credit monitoring cases . . . do not.’”  See Chad Pinson, New 
Legal Frontier: Mass Information Loss and Security Breach, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 27, 
47 (2007) (quoting Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. Civ. 03-0185PHVSRB, 
2005 WL 2465906, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2005)). 
 65. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632, 634. 
 66. Id. at 631–32. 
 67. Id. at 632. 
 68. Id. at 634. 
 69. Id.  Interestingly, in Lambert v. Hartman, in which the plaintiff filed a claim based on 
the publication of personal information as a result of the state’s publication of a traffic citation, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered purchasing credit monitoring service notification as 
sufficient damage in considering Article III standing.  517 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008); see also 
Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205 R, 2012 WL 2873892, at *4 (W.D. Ky. 
July 12, 2012) (relying on Lambert to find the purchase of credit monitoring services and change 
of telephone services as sufficient to “satisfy Article III’s requirement of an ‘actual or imminent 
injury’”). 
 70. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Low v. 
LinkedIn Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 WL 5509848, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011) 
(stating that “where sensitive personal data, such as names, addresses, social security numbers 
and credit card numbers, is improperly disclosed or disseminated into the public, increasing the 
risk of future harm, injury-in-fact has been recognized”).  Cf. Randolph v. ING Life Ins.  
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“if . . . the Plaintiffs had sued based on the risk that [the laptop] would be 
stolen at some point in the future.”71  The Krottner court looked to Pisciotta 
and its comparison to toxic substance, medical monitoring, and environmental 
claims to support its own finding.72 
2.  Courts Disagree on Standing in Security Breach Suits Without Proof of 
Unauthorized Third Party Access or Proof of Actual Economic Harm 
In contrast to the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the First and Third Circuits 
have held that the increased risk of identity theft is an insufficient injury to 
meet the requirements of Article III standing.73  These courts rationalize their 
holdings based on the speculative nature of any increased risk of future 
harm74—until the chain of “conjectures come[s] true, [plaintiffs] have not 
suffered any injury; there has been no misuse of the information, and thus, no 
harm.” 
In Katz v. Pershing, the First Circuit emphasized that relying on too many 
conjectures “would stretch the injury requirement past its breaking point.”75  
The plaintiff in Katz maintained a brokerage account with a firm that she felt 
failed to adequately secure her information.76  The court was convinced that 
                                                                                                                 
& Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–8 (D.D.C. 2007) (refusing to find standing when a computer 
containing the plaintiff’s personal information was stolen during a burglary caused an increased 
risk of identity theft); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006) 
(dismissing a class action suit for lack of standing where an unauthorized third-party accessed 
personal information of 96,000 customers). 
 71. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143.  For the Krottner court, in addition to finding an increased 
risk of identity theft as sufficient to confer standing, generalized anxiety caused by the theft of the 
laptop was a sufficiently concrete injury.  Id. at 1142. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that, because a plaintiff 
cannot “identify any incident in which her data has ever been accessed by an unauthorized 
person, she cannot satisfy Article III’s requirement of actual or impending injury”); Reilly v. 
Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff’s “alleged risk of future 
injury is nothing more than speculation” and cannot be considered actual or impending), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012); see also Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 
6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 2643307, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (concluding that 
“[p]laintiffs lack standing because their claims are future-oriented, hypothetical, and 
conjectural”); Allison v. Aetna, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. March 9, 2010) (holding that “it is highly speculative that [hackers] obtained any other 
information that would be necessary to commit identity theft” after plaintiff alleged that hackers 
only obtained his email address); Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (stating that a “[p]laintiff must allege that he has sustained or is in immediate 
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the challenged conduct”). 
 74. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (stating that the speculations include assuming that the hacker: 
“(1) read, copied, and understood their personal information; (2) intends to commit future 
criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information to the detriment 
of [the plaintiff] by making unauthorized transactions in [the plaintiff’s] name”). 
 75. Katz, 672 F.3d at 80. 
 76. Id. at 70.  Among her allegations, the plaintiff maintained that (1) her information was 
accessible in unencrypted form by authorized users around the clock and could be accessible to 
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without any allegation of actual improper access the plaintiff lacked standing 
to assert her claims.77 
In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., the Third Circuit agreed, noting that absent any 
identifiable proof that the plaintiff’s information had been accessed or used, 
mere knowledge of infiltration of a database firewall was too conjectural.78  
According to the Third Circuit, until the chain of “conjectures come[s] true, 
[plaintiffs] have not suffered any injury; there has been no misuse of the 
information, and thus, no harm.”79 
The First and Third Circuits’ holdings are distinguishable from Pisciotta’s 
sophisticated and malicious intrusion claim80 or Krottner’s stolen unencrypted 
data claim.81  These opinions demonstrate a hesitance to follow the recent trend 
that recognizes increased likelihood of harm as sufficient to confer standing 
because “the requirement of standing is firmly rooted in the Constitution and is 
not subject to whim.”82  Typically judges and commentators warn against 
setting precedent on jurisdictional issues based on public policy motives.83  
This underlying principle of limiting courts’ jurisdiction aligns with the 
purpose of the justiciability doctrine to prevent the judiciary from 
unconstitutionally usurping powers best left to the political branches.84 
3.  Plaintiffs Fail to Demonstrate Injury to Recover Damages in Negligence 
and Contract-Based Claims Despite a Court’s Finding of Standing 
Even in jurisdictions that accept increased risk of future identity theft as 
sufficient to confer Article III standing, plaintiffs still struggle with 
                                                                                                                 
hackers; (2) unauthorized access to her information was improperly monitored; and (3) 
procedures for end-user authentication were inadequate to protect her information.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 79. 
 78. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44. 
 79. Id. at 42; see also Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr., Joseph W. Felb & Walter F. Zalenski, 
Survey of Significant Consumer Privacy Litigation in the United States in 2006, 62 BUS. LAW. 
651, 651 (2007) (commenting that plaintiffs have had difficulty “in establishing that they have 
been damaged as the result of a data security breach”). 
 80. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 81. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 82. Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (E.D. Mo. 2009).  In 
Amburgy, the court stated that since the plaintiff conceded that he did not know whether his 
personal information had been compromised in the breach, the likelihood of identity theft was 
purely speculative and the injury was too abstract to confer standing.  Id. at 1052. 
 83. Whitemore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161 (1990) (“It is not for [the] Court to employ 
untethered notions of what might be good public policy to expand our jurisdiction in an appealing 
case.”). 
 84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 60.  One main theory underlying justiciability 
doctrines such as standing is to preserve the judiciary as the arbiter of cases or controversies.  See 
generally Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007) (comparing 
public and private rights’ views of the judiciary’s role). 
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successfully alleging compensable damages.85  Although alleging injury for the 
purposes of proving standing is similar, damages in tort must be more concrete 
to be compensable.86  Negligent conduct is not actionable unless there is an 
“individual whose interests have suffered.”87  Tort law typically does not allow 
recovery of damages for economic loss without some physical harm.88  As a 
result, contract-based claims tend to find more success than tort claims against 
the company maintaining the database.89  Even in the context of contract 
claims, although courts are somewhat reluctant to quantify the monetary value 
of increased risk of harm and emotional distress,90 “individual[s] losses from 
                                                 
 85. See, e.g., Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 640 (finding standing yet dismissing for failure to allege 
damages recognized by governing substantive law); Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08 
CV 00205 R., 2012 WL 2873892, at *6 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012) (stating that “an increased 
threat of an injury that may never materialize cannot satisfy the injury requirement” for damages); 
Hammond v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 
2643307, at *9–13 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (declaring that the “[p]laintiffs’ alleged increased 
risk of identity theft is insufficient to support Plaintiffs’ substantive claims” of negligence, breach 
of fiduciary duty, breach of implied contract, or state consumer protection laws); Amburgy, 671 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1054 (deciding that an “increased risk of identity theft, the time spent to monitor 
credit and other accounts, the loss and compromise of personal information, the loss of exclusive 
control over such information, and invasion of privacy” were insufficient to allege a compensable 
injury); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that, while 
plaintiffs met the requirement for standing based on increased risk of identity theft, state common 
law requires dismissal for failure to allege appreciable harm), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 689 (9th Cir. 
2010); Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 710, 716 (E.D. La. 2009) 
(holding that a plaintiff who fails to allege any financial losses cannot state a claim for negligence 
under Louisiana law and cannot recover for emotional damages without a physical injury); 
Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798 (M.D. La. 2007) (noting that by failing to show 
that he suffered “any actual damages—that someone actually used the disclosed information to 
his detriment,” a plaintiff failed to state a theory of damages that is recoverable or recognized by 
law); In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 497 (Me. 2010) 
(holding that time and effort is not recognized by Maine law as a compensable injury in a 
negligence claim). 
 86. See Bishop, supra note 11, at 10 (explaining that courts use a similar rationale in 
deciding standing and damages issues but noting that standing is a jurisdictional requirement that 
potentially has a lower threshold). 
 87. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
 88. See Bishop, supra note 11, at 18.  However, at least one jurisdiction has enacted a 
statutory exception to the traditional prohibition against purely economic damages in identity 
theft cases.  See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(a) (West 2008) (permitting recovery for 
economic loss in identity theft cases through the Illinois Consumer Protection and Deceptive 
Practices Act). 
 89. See Ambrose, Jr. et al., supra note 79, at 651–58 (comparing plaintiffs’ approaches to 
showing damages). 
 90. Stephen J. Rancourt, Hacking, Theft, and Corporate Negligence: Making the Case for 
Mandatory Encryption of Personal Information, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183, 195 (2011) 
(noting that quantifying damages suffered “down to a specific monetary number” proves difficult 
for most plaintiffs bringing actions arising out of data breaches). 
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identity theft [that] are generally fixed to the time and money spent in repairing 
credit.”91 
Further, when a consumer knows that his information has been exposed and 
used, at least one circuit has allowed for the recovery of expenditures on credit 
monitoring services.92  In those cases, the plaintiff will be required to show that 
there was a “reasonable basis for purchasing identity theft insurance to avoid 
further damage.”93  As such, a growing trend appears to be developing—actual 
identity theft, or real or attempted unauthorized use of the personal information 
is “a prerequisite for a successful claim based on a mass data breach.”94  These 
common law obstacles to a judicial remedy for data breaches force plaintiffs to 
file suit “on the thinnest of legal reeds that will rarely survive motions for 
summary judgment, if not motions to dismiss.”95 
C.  The Lack of Federal Data Privacy Laws Leaves Service Providers and 
Consumers Unsure of Data Security Obligations and Any Available Remedies 
It is no surprise that legislation and case law at the local, state, and federal 
levels have fallen behind innovations and advancements in technology.  
Congress has been slow to react to the challenges presented by new technology 
and has yet to enact comprehensive federal personal data security breach notice 
legislation.96  Despite this reluctance, it should be noted that Congress has 
enacted laws that prohibit hacking into databases with personal information,97 
restrict wiretapping where contents of a communication are intercepted in real 
                                                 
 91. Bishop, supra note 11, at n.70; see also Anita Ramasastry, Data Insecurity: What 
Remedy Should Consumers Have when Companies Do Not Keep Their Data Safe?, FINDLAW’S 
WRIT (March 6, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasatry/20060306.html (arguing that 
legislation should be drafted to overcome the economic loss rule and provide a remedy for 
consumers in data security breach situations). 
 92. Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 166 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Pinson, supra note 64, at 57. 
 95. Ian Ballon & Wendy Mantell, Defending Data Privacy and Behavioral Advertising 
Putative Class Action Suits, 1095 PLI/PAT 481, 485 (2012). 
 96. See Patricia E.M. Covington & Meghan S. Musselman, Recent Privacy and Data 
Security Developments, 65 BUS. LAW. 611, 612 (2010) (noting that with the new consumer 
financial protection agency, the federal government may be “positioning itself to regain 
prominence in the regulation of privacy and data security”); Carolyn A. Deverich, Brian R. 
Strange & David A. Holop, Into the Breach: Plaintiffs Have Been Increasingly Successful in 
Gaining Injunctive Relief for Online Security Breaches, 34 L.A. LAW 27, 30, 32 (2012) 
(explaining that the federal government has successfully passed data breach notification laws that 
affect some entities). 
 97. Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (prohibiting 
(1) unauthorized access to the data involving national security; (2) intentional access of 
government computers; (3) knowingly accessing a protected computer with the intent to commit 
fraud; (4) unlawfully obtaining financial information from a government agency or from a 
computer in interstate commerce; (5) causing damage to computers; (6) trafficking passwords; 
and (7) threatening to cause damage to a computer through extortion). 
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time98 or accessed in electronic storage,99 regulate the collection, 
dissemination, and use of consumer information by credit reporting 
agencies,100 and prohibit the disclosure of personal information kept by federal 
agencies without consent of the individual to whom the information pertains.101  
In practice, however, commentators find that these federal statutes fail to 
adequately provide a remedy for consumers who fall victim to data security 
breaches.102  None of Congress’s efforts have addressed data breaches that 
have not resulted in actual identity theft; instead, Congress requires plaintiffs 
to allege a minimum monetary damage amount to bring a civil action, which is 
often difficult for plaintiffs to meet.103  Numerous comprehensive data privacy 
bills have been proposed in Congress, but none have found substantial support 
in either chamber.104  In contrast, administrative agencies have begun to devote 
attention to the growing issue.105 
                                                 
 98. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006 & Supp. 
2012). 
 99. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 100. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (2006) 
 101. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. 2012); Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006) (establishing guidelines for online 
management of personal information of children under the age of thirteen). 
 102. Ballon & Mantell, supra note 95, at 486 (discussing how the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act requirement of  “showing . . . unauthorized access to the contents of 
a communication” poses an obstacle for plaintiffs because personal information is not considered 
“contents” under the Act); see, e.g., Hill v. MCI WorldCom Commc’n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 
1195–96 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (holding that names, addresses, and phone numbers allegedly divulged 
were not considered by the court to fall within the statutory definition of “contents” under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act); Jessup-Morgan v. Am. Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 
1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act did not 
apply to AOL’s disclosure of information identifying an AOL electronic communication account 
because the disclosure was made to a private party rather than to a governmental entity). 
 103. See, e.g., Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)(B)(i) (2006) 
(requiring a minimum of $5,000 in aggregate damages within a one year period to maintain a 
cause of action).  This minimum damages requirement was later repealed.  18 U.S.C. § 103(a)(5) 
(Supp. 2012). 
 104. See e.g., S. 1535, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced on Sep. 8, 2011, and sent to the House 
or Senate for consideration on Sep. 22, 2011, with no further action); S. 1408, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(introduced on July 22, 2011, and the committees assigned to the bill sent it to the House or 
Senate as a whole for consideration on September 22, 2011, but no further action has been taken); 
H.R. 5318, 109th  Cong. (2006) (introduced on May 9, 2006, but was not enacted); ); H.R. 4127, 
109th Cong. (2005) (introduced on March 19, 2006, but was not enacted); H.R. 3997, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (introduced into Congress on March 16, 2006, but was not enacted); S. 1789, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (introduced on Sep. 19, 2005, but was not enacted); S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(introduced on July 28, 2005, but not enacted); S. 1326, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced but no 
roll call votes taken). 
 105. Rebecca S. Eisner et. al., A Year in the Clouds: More Businesses Adopt Enterprise 
Cloud Computing Despite Privacy and Data Concerns, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 
OUTSOURCING 2012: CLOUD INNOVATION AND OTHER HOT TOPICS 177, 188–93 (discussing the 
FTC’s response to businesses’ adoption of new technology and data security). 
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The FTC and the recently created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau are 
the primary sources of federal consumer protection enforcement.106  In 2010, 
the FTC released a suggested framework for businesses to use in assessing and 
implementing data privacy standards.107  The FTC uses its authority to regulate 
unfair practices by pursuing companies that fail to take “reasonable and 
appropriate measures” to secure personal information.108  By regulating 
businesses that aggregate consumer personal information, these government 
entities aim to protect the privacy of consumers who share this information 
with a service provider or business.109 
In addition to prohibiting unfair practices,110 the FTC relies heavily on the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to help ensure consumer privacy.111  Under the Act, 
the FTC requires financial institutions to provide consumers with notice of a 
privacy policy.112  The Act also requires financial institutions to implement a 
written safeguarding program that corresponds with the size, nature, 
complexity, and scope of the institution’s business.113 
Despite these efforts, no federal statute or administrative action mandates 
absolute standards.114  Instead, businesses are forced to rely on guiding 
principles, including the limitation of network access, use of comprehensive 
security software, creation of strong passwords and data encryption, and 
curtailment of the storage of unnecessary data.115  Consequently, the key to 
avoiding liability for data breaches is to adopt privacy standards that are 
                                                 
 106. See Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Trade Commission 
Pledge to Work Together to Protect Consumers (Jan. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/01/ftccfpb.shtm. 
 107. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
 108. Covington & Musselman, supra note 96, at 613–15 (discussing recent FTC enforcement 
actions based on a claim of unfair practice). 
 109. Roland L. Trope & E. Michael Power, Lessons in Data Governance: A Survey of Legal 
Developments in Data Management, Privacy and Security, 61 BUS. LAW. 471, 504 (2005).  
Entities meeting the definition of a “financial institution” are required to: (1) identify at least one 
employee to coordinate a security program; (2) determine reasonably foreseeable risks to security 
of customer information; (3) design and implement a security program to control risks with 
regular procedure assessments; (4) contract with service providers that can maintain appropriate 
safeguards for consumer personal information and contractually require maintenance of these 
safeguards; and (5) evaluate and adjust procedures according to changes in circumstance.  16 
C.F.R. § 314.4 (2012). 
 110. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); see supra note 108 
and accompanying text. 
 111. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Covington & Musselman, supra note 96, at 614–15. 
 112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6803–6804 (2006). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Eisner et. al., supra note 105, at 545. 
 115. Id. 
782 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:765 
designed to prevent a breach before it occurs.116  Although many business are 
aware of the importance of such security measures, the lack of concrete federal 
guidance leaves businesses unsure of how to comply with data security 
rules.117   
In contrast to the relative inactivity at the federal level, a majority of state 
legislatures have enacted data security measures reflecting the need to protect 
consumer privacy interests.118  State laws on data security largely focus on 
providing timely notification to consumers following a security breach.119  
Notification requirements garner intense media attention and may create 
apprehension among consumers whose personal information is stored by a 
business experiencing a breach.120  In addition to requiring notification in the 
event of a security breach, a select few states require businesses to implement 
proactive safeguards for data security.121  The statutes, however, are still 
                                                 
 116. See Fernando M. Pinguelo, Wayne Lee & Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real 
Damages Part II: What Businesses Can Do Today to Protect Themselves from Cybercrime, and 
What Public-Private Partnerships Are Attempting to Achieve for the Nation of Tomorrow, 17 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 75, 82 (2012).  Advanced planning is essential such that “[i]n an emergency incident 
response situation, a well-written and properly socialized incident response plan will be the best 
method to inform the relevant stakeholders, identify the incident, and contain the security 
breach.”  Id. 
 117. See Dort, supra note 11, at *8 (explaining that, in light of disclosure obligations, 
businesses often choose to comply with the most stringent statutes and provide the same 
information to all implicated individuals, regardless of the requirements in their state of 
residence). 
 118. See Covington & Musselman, supra note 96, at 617  (noting that forty-four states 
already had some type of security breach notification law in place prior to 2009, when legislation 
introduced in the House of Representatives made federal regulation a distinct possibility). 
 119. 2012 Security Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 
13, 2012),  http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach-legislation-2012.aspx 
(indicating that as of December 2012, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands have enacted some form of statutory notification requirement to provide 
guidance in the event of a security breach that exposed personal information).  Only Alabama, 
Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota do not mandate notification following a security 
breach.  See State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach 
-notification-laws.aspx. 
 120. See Gonzalez, supra note 5, at 1355; Trope & Power, supra note 109, at 487 (quoting E. 
MICHAEL POWER & ROLAND L. TROPE, SAILING IN DANGEROUS WATERS: A DIRECTOR’S GUIDE 
TO DATA GOVERNANCE 301 (2005)).  Of the two statutory schemes regarding notification, the 
more flexible model, used by California, does not require disclosure in every instance, providing 
a business with the opportunity to address a breach situation as it deems appropriate.  See Trope 
& Power, supra note 109, at 488 (quoting Data Breaches and Identity Theft: Prepared Statement 
of Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 109th Cong. 11–12 
(2005) (statement of Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n)). 
 121. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(b) (West 2011) (instructing businesses with 
access to personal information to implement security procedures); CAL. CIV. CODE  
§ 1798.81.5(c) (West 2009) (mandating a business that maintains personal information to adopt 
reasonable security measures to protect data); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 2(a) (West 
Supp. 2012) (requiring the drafting of regulations to “safeguard the personal information of 
2013] Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts 783 
largely insufficient because they require notification only in certain 
circumstances, do not require data encryption, or do not provide a private 
cause of action.122  Inconsistencies among state statutes on businesses’ pre- and 
post-breach duties result in confusion on how businesses should comply in an 
interstate context.123 
II.  THE SPLIT IN CIRCUIT OPINIONS AND THE RELUCTANCE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT TO HEAR THE ISSUE LEAVE AN OPEN QUESTION WITH WHICH THE 
CIRCUIT COURTS MUST WRESTLE 
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Reilly, leaving unanswered 
questions on whether a consumer whose personal information has been 
exposed following a data breach has suffered an injury sufficient to confer 
standing in federal court.124  With a lack of consensus among circuits and no 
clarification from the Supreme Court, district courts have struggled to 
reconcile settled standing jurisprudence with existing data security 
precedent.125  As a result, clear guidance for future data breach suits is needed.  
Courts, however, are in a challenging position.  If they find standing, they are 
arguably extending constitutional jurisdiction beyond its bounds, but reaching 
                                                                                                                 
residents of the [C]ommonwealth” of Massachusetts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.210 
(LexisNexis 2011) (providing instructions to destroy personal information when a business no 
longer needs the records); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-64 (2011) (directing businesses to develop 
preventative measures to protect against “unauthorized access” to personal information); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 646A.622 (West Supp. 2011) (requiring businesses to implement security measures 
to protect personal information); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.052 (West 2011) (same). 
 122. See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 5, at 1365, 1368, 1370–71 (arguing that an Arizona data 
security statute fails to protect consumers because it only requires notification when the business 
anticipates material harm as a result of the security breach, conservatively defines “personal 
information” so that that some data is left unprotected, and does not allow consumers to seek 
retribution in a private action against the company at fault); see also Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l 
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting similar deficiencies in Indiana’s data 
security statute, which mandates “only that a database owner disclose a security breach to 
potentially affected consumers,” requiring no other action to mitigate the breach and foreclosing 
private causes of action). 
 123. See Pinson, supra note 64, at 62–63 (2007); see also Pinguelo et al., supra note 116, at 
75 (advocating for cooperation between the public and private sectors in order to make sense of 
the varying jurisdictional approaches to regulating the prevention and mitigation of security 
breaches). 
 124. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 46 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2395 (2012). 
 125. See, e.g., Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (E.D. Mo. 
2009) (declining to adopt the rationale that the Pisciotta court used to find standing because it 
“engaged in no discussion applying the Supreme Court’s recognized standard for determining 
whether plaintiffs in a database breach case had standing under Article III); Hammond v. Bank of 
N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 2643307, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 
2010) (citing Pisciotta’s failure to apply applicable case law in its determination that plaintiff 
lacked standing). 
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an outcome that is fair and just for consumers.126  On the other hand, by 
denying standing in data breach suits, courts are likely conforming with the 
law, but hurting consumers and effectuating bad public policy.127 
A.  Holding That an Increased Threat of Future Identity Theft Is Sufficient to 
Confer Article III Standing Stretches the Doctrine to Its Limits 
If courts follow the approach taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that an 
increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to establish standing, negligent 
businesses whose data is stolen would be held accountable in a court of law.  
Consequently, recognizing standing in this unique realm of putative class 
action suits would create an incentive for businesses to proactively minimize 
the dangers of security breaches.128  On the other hand, by denying standing to 
plaintiffs in data breach suits who have not yet had their identity stolen, courts 
can avoid a merits determination on a technicality.129  Precluding legal redress 
forces consumers to navigate the complex nature of modern database 
management without any standards against which to hold businesses or any 
redress for a failure to meet those standards.130  The potential injustice 
resulting from the consumer bearing the responsibility of a business’s 
negligent maintenance of personal information demonstrates the need for a 
mechanism under which a business shares in the liability.131 
                                                 
 126. See infra Part II.A. 
 127. See infra Part II.B. 
 128. Dort, supra note 11, at *4 (explaining that businesses will take preventative measures to 
avoid litigation).  Common steps towards minimizing security breaches include: “1. Securing a 
networked environment from within a comprehensive firewall and controlling access to the 
network; 2. Implementing external data security; 3. Installing networked security traps; 4. 
Applying system and personal identity verification protocols; 5. Implementing data encryption; 
[and] 6. installing intrusion detection systems . . . .”  Id. 
 129. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 39, at 1, 14–15 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
routinely invokes the standing doctrine to avoid resolving disputes in more controversial cases, 
particularly cases with racial overtones). 
 130. See Pinguelo et al., supra note 116, at 80–84 (explaining the complex nature of 
cybercrimes and cybercriminals and the many steps a business should take to maintain the 
security of its information and prevent against a security breach); Bob Sullivan, Study: ID Theft 
Usually an Inside Job, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 21, 2004, 7:03:32 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5015565/ (referring to the “painstakingly” difficult process of 
tracing the origin of an identity theft crime).  Identity thieves intercept millions of pieces of 
personal information that can be used fraudulently in a number of ways.  See Chronology of Data 
Breaches  Security Breaches 2005 – Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 19, 
2013), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach  (showing 607,280,163 records breached and 
3,665 data breaches made public since 2005). 
 131. See Pinson, supra note 64, at 31–32 (identifying the types of personal information and 
the cost associated with a security breach and the growing trend, as evidenced by state data 
security legislation, of compelling businesses to guard against and bear the burden of a breach); 
Schneider, supra note 60, at 290–93 (proposing two measures: (1) recognizing a new type of 
injury that allows for recovery in a security breach; or (2) providing for a negligence cause of 
action by the state to hold businesses accountable for negligent management of consumer data); 
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In spite of consumer protection advocates’ desire for an expansion of the 
definition of an injury in fact, courts have a duty to uphold the Constitution and 
respect the roles of the political branches of government.132  Article III requires 
that the federal judiciary only hear “cases” and “controversies.”133  Injury is 
not only required for a plaintiff to succeed on the merits of a claim,134 but it is 
clear through standing jurisprudence that the failure to allege an actual injury is 
an absolute bar to accessing federal court.135  The Supreme Court, as the final 
arbiter in the interpretation of the Constitution, often resists addressing the 
merits of a claim when standing is in dispute to avoid the perception that the 
judiciary is usurping the lawmaking authority of the legislature and the 
enforcement power of the executive branch.136  However, the Court has 
historically expanded the standing doctrine to consider harms that might be 
more speculative, rather than concerete, in nature.137  For example, the Court 
recognized standing when plaintiffs alleged that enjoyment of the environment 
could be diminished by the potential likelihood of decreased recycling caused 
by an increase in freight rates.138  Yet, some courts have not recognized the 
irreparable damages to financial reputations and freedoms of consumers caused 
by data breaches as sufficient injury for standing.139 
However, even if the courts grant standing, it is unlikely that a consumer 
will be able to allege compensable injury for purposes of determining a 
                                                                                                                 
Blades, supra note 11, at 526 (suggesting that businesses should bear the cost of credit monitoring 
to “prevent the injustice of requiring the economically disadvantaged consumer from paying fees 
caused by the [business’s] negligence”). 
 132. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (describing standing as a principle “built 
on a single basic idea – the idea of separation of powers”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 
279 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Seven Treasures Publications 2008) (stating that 
“[a]fter discriminating . . . the several classes of power . . . the next and most difficult task is to 
provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others.  What this security 
ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.”). 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 134. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text. 
 136. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 60. 
 137. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516–26 (2007) (finding 
that the state of Massachusetts had standing to sue the Environmental Protection Agency because 
the state has an interest in the coastal lands lost by rising water levels, even in the absence of a 
visible claim by an individual harmed by greenhouse gases); United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686–87 (1973) (holding that students 
who claimed their enjoyment of forests, streams, and mountains would be diminished had shown 
sufficient harm to meet Article III standing requirements). 
 138. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 675–76. 
 139. See Robert Terenzi, Jr., Note, When Cows Fly: Expanding Cognizable Injury-in-Fact 
and Interest Group Litigation, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1604 (2009) (discussing the need to 
include potential future injuries in the scope of the injury requirement).  A 2007 study by the 
Identity Theft Resource Center found that seventy percent of identity theft victims require up to a 
year to resolve issues caused by identity theft, while almost twenty percent of victims need two or 
more years to resolve any credit issues.  IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., supra note 8, at tbl. 9. 
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damage award.140  An additional exception to the traditional common law rule 
requiring non-economic harm to successfully allege damages in a negligence 
claim would also be required.141  Just as with standing, courts are historically 
reluctant to create new causes of action, and  prefer to leave that task to the 
legislature.142 
As a matter of public policy, however, businesses, who are in a better 
position to avoid data security breaches, should be held accountable for their 
negligence.143  Ensuring that consumers have some judicial remedy for a 
business’s careless database management would save the consumer from 
bearing the costs associated with the aftermath.144 
B.  Alternatively, Holding That an Increased Risk of Identity Theft is Too 
Speculative or Conjectural to Confer Article III Standing Comports with 
Recognized Standing Jurisprudence, But at the Detriment to Consumers 
A determination that an increased risk of identity theft is too speculative or 
conjectural to confer Article III standing in data security breach suits could 
assure businesses that they will not face a flood of federal class action suits in 
the aftermath of a security breach, regardless of whether the breach was due to 
the negligence of the database manager.145  Since federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction that can only hear cases or controversies within 
                                                 
 140. See e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding 
standing yet dismissing a suit for failure to allege damages recognized by the governing 
substantive law); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that, while 
a plaintiff may meet the standing requirement based on an increased risk of identity theft, state 
common law may require dismissal of the claim for failure to allege appreciable harm), aff’d, 380 
F. App’x 689 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Security Breach Litig., 4 
A.3d 492, 496 (Me. 2010) (holding that time and effort is not usually recognized by Maine case 
law as a compensable injury in a negligence claim). 
 141. See e.g., Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(mitigating plaintiffs’ costs by finding that purchasing identity theft insurance was reasonable to 
avoid further economic damage when a third party had conducted unauthorized transactions using 
the plaintiff’s information). 
 142. See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 637 (deferring to the legislature’s intent and refusing to 
recognize credit monitoring costs as compensable damages because, “[h]ad the . . . legislature 
intended that a cause of action should be available . . . for failing to protect adequately personal 
information, we believe that it would have made some more definite statement of that intent”). 
 143. For example, the database manager can more easily monitor database security.  Since 
businesses are the entities with which consumers entrust their personal information, it logically 
follows that the businesses should be charged with protecting consumer information. 
 144. Costs might include lost time, money, and security.  Consumers often close potentially 
compromised accounts, purchase credit monitoring services, spend time monitoring their 
accounts themselves, and experience increased stress and worry as a result of the breach.  See 
IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., supra note 8, at 2–4. 
 145. Since standing is a jurisdictional hurdle that can be addressed sua sponte, a Supreme 
Court decision declaring that breach victims lack standing provides concrete precedent for 
dismissal.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional limits, a court may not consider the merits of a case if it 
determines that the plaintiff does not have standing.146 
By refusing to expand the standing doctrine’s injury analysis to include 
increased risk of future harm, the courts reaffirm the principle that the alleged 
injury must be concrete and particularized to the plaintiff.147  This 
determination also serves the guiding twin rationales behind the doctrine: 
separation of powers and judicial efficiency.148  But, as many commentators 
have suggested, consideration of injury for standing purposes inherently 
implicates weighing the merits of the claim.149  However, considering the 
double hurdle faced by plaintiffs in data breach suits, it is unlikely that the 
judiciary will risk its reputation as the non-political branch150 by expanding the 
realm of standing and classification of compensable damages in order to permit 
consumers an avenue for relief.151 
C.  Congress Could Pass Much Needed Comprehensive Data Privacy 
Legislation to Resolve Uncertain Obligations of Service Providers and Provide 
Remedies to Consumers After a Data Security Breach 
Congress can minimize the hurdle faced by plaintiffs in data security breach 
suits.  By creating a private cause of action specifically delineating affected 
parties as the proper parties to bring suit,152 Congress can provide a statutory 
solution to the problem facing consumers when attempting to assert their 
claims in federal court.  Clearly articulating its intent to confer a right to sue to 
affected parties in the legislative history could permit Congress to effectively 
resolve the issue for consumers without the statute being found 
unconstitutional.  An act of Congress would also resolve inconsistencies 
between varying state statutes. 
The lack of uniformity in state laws governing data management and 
security breach notification leaves businesses, especially those doing business 
nationally, struggling to comply with forty-six individual laws, each imposing 
                                                 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 147. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 148. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 59–60. 
 149. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 39, at 39–42 (articulating that standing is often used by 
courts to avoid making decisions based on the merits of the claim due to a technicality); Nichol, 
Jr., supra note 39, at 636–37 (disapproving of the Court’s application of the standing doctrine in 
reaching a decision); Tushnet, supra note 39, at 664 (criticizing the use of standing as a way for 
courts to avoid difficult claims and proposing abolishing the current jurisprudence). 
 150. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90–91 (1947) (articulating the fear that 
“[s]hould the courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined 
controversies over constitutional issues, they would become the organs of political  
theories . . . and would properly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches” of 
government). 
 151. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 152. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (discussing statutory standing). 
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different obligations and providing varying remedies.153  Federal laws 
governing privacy have proven difficult to apply to data security breaches due 
to narrow definitions and the unique nature of modern data management.154  
Regulatory guidance by the FTC has provided some assistance in 
compliance,155 but the general deficiencies of explicit federal direction have 
forced businesses to self regulate, thereby placing consumers at the mercy of 
the marketplace.156  Since the Internet has created a global exchange of 
information that crosses state and international boundaries, Congress should 
intervene by providing comprehensive data management standards and 
remedies for consumers harmed by negligent data management. 
Congress crafted a legislative solution to a similar, albeit different, problem 
when it enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) to 
protect consumers from telephone abuses.157  In addition to authorizing the 
Federal Communications Commission to promulgate regulations implementing 
the statute, the TCPA, a strict liability statute, gave consumers a private cause 
of action against violators.158  The TCPA has proven to be an effective 
enforcement mechanism, with consumers bringing successful suits against 
alleged violators.159  Consumer success in bringing and prevailing in TCPA 
                                                 
 153. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1798.80–.84 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013) (imposing data 
protection obligations and authorizing suits for damages from breach of the duty to maintain data 
security); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(4) (2012) (disallowing private causes of action for 
consumers impacted by a data breach); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681 (West 2006) (imposing only 
civil penalties for failure to maintain data security). 
 154. See Ballon & Mantell, supra note 95, at 486 (discussing how the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) requirement of “showing . . . an unauthorized access to the 
contents of a communication” poses an obstacle for plaintiffs because personal information is not 
considered “contents” under the ECPA); see e.g., Hill v. MCI WorldCom Commc’n, 120 F. Supp. 
2d 1194, 1196 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint because it could not support 
a finding that MCI disclosed information that satisfied the ECPA definition of “content”);  
Jessup-Morgan v. Am. Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (finding that 
definitions of the ECPA, as written, made the Act inapplicable to subpoenas for communications 
information). 
 155. See Dort, supra note 11, at *5–6 (noting that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act “requires the 
FTC . . . to issue regulations ensuring that financial institutions protect the privacy and security of 
customer financial information”). 
 156. Eisner et al., supra note 105, at 185–86. 
 157. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006 & Supp. 2011).  
The TCPA prohibits a variety of practices ranging from unsolicited facsimile advertisements to 
the use of automatic telephone dialing systems and prerecorded messages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).  
For a detailed discussion about how private enforcement of public laws is beneficial to private 
parties and helps supplement public enforcement, see J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of 
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).  Private 
enforcement mechanisms have seen some success in deterring behavior alongside traditional civil 
and criminal penalties brought on by governmental entities.  Id. at 1153–58. 
 158. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 
 159. See Paul Karlsgodt, Battleground TCPA, CLASSACTIONBLAWG.COM (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://classactionblawg.com/2011/10/20/battleground-tcpa/ (noting that class action suits are 
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suits provides support for the idea that Congress should create an effective and 
useful remedial tool for consumers affected by data breaches. 
III.  CONGRESS SHOULD PASS COMPREHENSIVE DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE FOR BUSINESSES AND CONSUMERS 
It is unlikely that, absent any state or federal statute, courts will be persuaded 
that data security breaches and the resulting increased risk of identity theft are 
a sufficient basis to establish standing.160  By deferring the authority to create a 
private cause of action to Congress or state legislatures, the judiciary stays 
within its proper role in the American system of government.161  Congress is 
the most appropriate branch to resolve any issues arising from novel concepts 
of law.  Further, while enforcement may be pursued through the FTC or 
another qualified regulatory agency, it is the duty of Congress to make the 
laws.162 
Congress’s constitutional authority to pass comprehensive data privacy 
legislation arises under the Commerce Clause, which is used to pass statutes 
that regulate interstate commerce.163  By passing federal data privacy 
legislation that preempts state law, Congress would provide businesses serving 
consumers nationwide legal certainty as to which law applies.164  While there 
have been many legislative proposals to resolve the lack of clarity in data 
privacy, none have gained sufficient support to become law.165  Due to the 
                                                                                                                 
increasing in prevalence under the private cause of action created by the TCPA, particularly 
alleged violations of the prohibition on unsolicited facsimile advertisements). 
 160. See supra Part I.B. 
 161. See supra notes 30–33, 84 and accompanying text (discussing separation of powers as a 
primary reason for the standing doctrine). 
 162. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Congress has the authority “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”  Id.; see Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17, 22 (2005) (finding that in the aggregate, marijuana grown for personal 
consumption intrastate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and, therefore, can be 
regulated by Congress); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–63 (1995) (holding that 
possession of a gun near a school is not an economic activity that has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce and, therefore, is not within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–04 (1964) (holding that Congress was within its 
power under the Commerce Clause to forbid restaurants from discriminating against racial 
minorities based on the rationale that interstate travelers and serving food crossed state lines); 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–58 (1964) (holding that Congress 
could prohibit discrimination in public accommodations pursuant to the Commerce Clause); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) (finding that intrastate wheat production could 
be regulated by the Agricultural Adjustment Act because it had a substantial effect on interstate 
wheat demand); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1824) (stating that Congress has the power 
to regulate interstate commerce that includes regulation of navigable waterways). 
 164. See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1056–57 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(demonstrating that confusion can arise as to which state’s data privacy law governs in a class 
action suit). 
 165. See supra note 104 (collecting a number of congressional proposals beginning in 2005). 
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complexity of the issue, it has been nearly impossible for Congress to account 
for various circumstances and protections needed.166  In order to resolve the 
standing and damages issues presented in this novel area of law, a complex 
statutory structure that provides a private cause of action, imposes penalties for 
noncompliance, requires notification in all instances of data security breaches, 
permits recovery of civil damages by consumers, and authorizes the FTC to 
promulgate regulatory details is essential. 
A.  Congress Should Authorize the FTC to Establish Minimum Standards of 
Data Management and Impose Civil Penalties for Noncompliance 
One failure of the state data security statutes is the lack of standards required 
for data management.167  The FTC has proposed generic guidelines of basic 
precautions to protect consumers’ personal information, but the agency does 
not currently have authority to promulgate official regulations.168  Congress 
can inhibit unauthorized, third parties from extracting personal information, 
such as social security numbers, by authorizing the FTC to impose regulations 
that require encryption of all consumer information stored in a database.169  If 
Congress makes the demand for universal encryption of data through statutory 
authorization to the FTC, the FTC can promulgate rules and regulations that 
require encryption based on the size of the business and the type of personal 
information stored.  By requiring encryption of personal identification and 
account information that is stored or in transit, the FTC can tailor regulations 
by balancing expenses to the business and consumer protection interests with 
the overall public policy goal of preventing future litigation.170  In addition, 
because a large number of data security breaches occur due to negligent 
database management, Congress should impose stringent standards for firewall 
protection.171  Such firewall standards can also be considered and promulgated 
by the FTC.172 
                                                 
 166. Congress sometimes authorizes independent departments and agencies to promulgate 
the specific implementation details because they are better placed to account for business and 
consumer concerns through the rulemaking process.  See Pinguelo et al. supra note 116, at 86. 
 167. See Gonzalez, supra note 5, at 1373 (discussing Arizona’s statute). 
 168. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 107, at iv–vii. 
 169. See Rancourt, supra note 90, at 214 (encouraging the use of mandatory encryption for 
data in transmission and storage). 
 170. J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting Privacy 
in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI L. REV. 109, 127–29, 132–33 (2008) (detailing the FTC’s 
current attempts to address data security and consumer personal information); Deverich et al. 
supra note 96, at 27–28. 
 171. A firewall is a software or hardware-based method to keep networks secure.  Rolf 
Oppliger, Internet Security: Firewalls and Beyond, 40 COMM. OF THE ACM 92, 94 (1997).  A 
firewall controls the incoming and outgoing network traffic by analyzing data packets and 
determining whether the packets analyzed should be permitted into the network.  Id. 
 172. See Rancourt, supra note 90, at 214. 
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Large penalties should be set for failure to comply with the regulations in 
order to deter noncompliance.173  The federal statute should impose a daily 
penalty to be collected and enforced by the FTC of $1,000 when information is 
left unencrypted, and a $5,000 daily penalty when unencrypted information is 
knowingly or willingly exposed to an unauthorized third-party.174    Finally, the 
statute should impose a daily $10,000 penalty when leaving information 
unencrypted ultimately results in identity theft in at least one case.  This step 
-rate structure of penalties incentivizes business compliance due to the 
uncertainty of whether identity theft will actually occur.175  Requiring 
minimum industry standards of data encryption allows businesses to formulate 
and adopt data management procedures that best fit each individual business, 
while penalizing noncompliance ensures that businesses will encrypt data to 
avoid fines.176 
                                                 
 173. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPLEMENTING THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY 
PROTECTION ACT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/coppa/07COPPA_Report_to_Congress.pdf (articulating the FTC’s 
report to Congress in which it stated that civil penalties should grow increasingly larger to deter 
unlawful conduct). 
 174. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006) (illustrating a similar penalty structure for knowingly or 
willingly violating the TCPA).  The TCPA has been effective with minimal statutory damages of 
$500.  Id.  In comparison, the ECPA permits statutory damages for wiretapping offenses in the 
amount of $100 per day, up to $10,000.  18 U.S.C. § 2520 (C) (2) (2006).  The Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act, a statute requiring retailers to redact an individual’s credit card number 
and expiration date from a transaction receipt, allows for damages from $100.00 to $1,000 per 
violation.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n (a)(1)(A) (2006).  The addition of a penalty with no connection to 
the number of consumers affected, collected separate from the statutory damages recoverable by 
plaintiffs, would provide an additional incentive for businesses to comply regardless of any civil 
litigation that might arise. 
 175. See Brendan St. Amant, Recent Development, The Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in 
Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 505, 520 (2007) (stating 
that only two percent of those affected by data breaches are victims of related fraud).  Because the 
motives of those perpetrating the data breach are often unknown, it is difficult to predict which 
breaches will result in fraud.  See id. at 522–23 n.141 (citing Data Security: The Discussion Draft 
of Data Protection Legislation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 29, 29–30 (2005) 
(statement by Chris Hoofnagle, Dir. and Senior Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center)).  
Such uncertainty regarding the risks of and circumstances leading up to the breach, as well as the 
serious and sometimes permanent effects of a breach, help to illustrate the importance and 
appropriateness of a deterrent penalty, the goals of which is to “impose a cost on wrongdoers that 
promotes compliance with the law.”  Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground 
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1830 (1992). 
 176. Mann, supra note 175, at 1831; see also Trope & Power, supra note 109, at 488 
(discussing the flexibility available with similar minimum industry standards). 
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B.  Congress Should Require Consumer Notification in the Event of a Data 
Breach in All Situations 
The widespread proliferation of state-level data breach notification statutes 
illustrates their perceived effectiveness.177  Some states impose a qualified 
notification requirement, only mandating disclosure in certain circumstances, 
such as when the stolen data was unencrypted.178  However, a statute requiring 
notification, regardless of encryption, best serves the interests of consumers by 
providing an additional incentive for businesses to actively protect consumer 
information.179  Although “over-notification may desensitize consumers to 
identity theft,”180 these notification requirements would not cover situations in 
which a person lawfully accesses, but improperly uses, a consumer’s personal 
information.181  Thus, requiring notification in all instances of mass data 
breach in which personal information, such as social security and credit card 
numbers, dates of birth, names, and addresses, has been exposed best serves 
the interests of all parties by providing businesses with an incentive to comply 
and a standard with which to meet and giving consumers assurance that they 
will be notified in the occurrence of a breach.182 
C.  Congress Should Create a Private Cause of Action, But Should Limit 
Damages to Credit Monitoring Service Expenditures and Attorneys Fees 
As this Comment has discussed, plaintiffs in data security breach suits face 
an uphill battle to a judicial remedy.183  Some state statutes allow for 
governmental enforcement but do not allow consumers to bring civil suits.184  
Creating a statutory cause of action, coupled with a federal enforcement 
                                                 
 177. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 119 (indicating that at least 
forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have codified 
data breach notification requirements). 
 178. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (Supp. 2012) (only requiring notification in the 
event of a security breach involving unencrypted data). 
 179. See Brandon Faulkner, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
1097, 1104, 1100 (2007) (stating that the traditional deterrent of civil litigation has seemingly 
failed to deter companies from acting negligently when securing their consumers’ personal 
information). 
 180. Gonzalez, supra note 5, at 1370. 
 181. See Sullivan, supra note 130. 
 182. See Gonzalez, supra note 5, at 1365–66; see also Faulkner, supra note 179, at 1114 
(arguing that a “preemptive, federal breach notification statute” can eliminate the added 
transactional costs required by a company attempting to comply with various jurisdictions’ 
individual notification statutes).  Faulkner also highlights that differences between states include 
the definition of personal identification information, when the notification is triggered, and what 
qualifies as timely notification.  Id. at 1104. 
 183. See supra Part I.B. 
 184. Supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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mechanism, would resolve the standing hurdle.185   Further, in order to assuage 
plaintiffs’ challenge in establishing damages, Congress should recognize that 
credit-monitoring services that are purchased as a direct result of a data breach 
notification represent a compensable injury.186 
Such a provision would not automatically cause a flood of litigation 
following a mass security breach because plaintiffs will still need to show the 
business’s failure to comply with the set statutory requirements for data 
security.  Additionally, imposing a recovery limit of $1,000 per plaintiff187 
would check potentially speculative damage awards while still allowing 
consumers to recover for credit-monitoring services employed during the years 
immediately following the data breach.188  Since this damage award is not 
automatic, a plaintiff will need to invest his or her time and money to bring a 
civil suit, which will further help to limit litigation to plaintiffs with significant 
personal interest in the matter. Further, because fewer than twenty percent of 
consumers affected by a data breach purchase credit monitoring services as a 
result of the breach, the number of litigants would be limited.189   These 
safeguards ensure that plaintiffs will not assert broad and unfounded claims 
based on a hypothetical fear of identity theft and guarantees that recovery is 
limited to actual expenses incurred by a plaintiff because of a business’s 
noncompliance with regulatory standards for data security management. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s wavering standing jurisprudence has resulted in 
inconsistent interpretations as to what constitutes a personally suffered 
injury.190  Lower courts are therefore without guidance when applying the 
standing doctrine to novel questions of law provoked by new technologies.  
Federal courts are split in deciding whether sufficient injury has incurred for 
standing purposes when consumers’ personal information has been exposed to 
                                                 
 185. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975), superseded by statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) 
(2006), as recognized in Mylonakis v. Georgios, No. H-10-3031, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171649, 
at *65–67 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2012). 
 186. See 47 § U.S.C. 227(b)(3) (2006) (illustrating an analogous action damages allowance). 
 187. Debunking the Hype over ID Theft: You Don’t Need a Costly Service to Protect Your 
Good Name, CONSUMER REPORTS MONEY ADVISOR (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/02/debunking-the-hype-over-id-theft/index.htm 
(discussing identity theft protection, which averages between $120 and $300 annually); Identity 
Theft Protection Services Review, TOPTENREVIEWS.COM, http://identity-theft-protection-services 
-review.toptenreviews.com/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (comparing identity-theft protection 
services products offered in the marketplace). 
 188. PONEMON INST., 2012 CONSUMER STUDY ON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/brochures/ponemon-notification-study 
-2012.pdf (stating that mass data breaches resulted in “some level of concern” for eighty-eight 
percent of affected customers). 
 189. Id. at 24. 
   190.   See supra notes 36–59 and accompanying text. 
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an unauthorized third-party but has not yet been used fraudulently.  Some 
courts consider the increased likelihood of future identity theft as a sufficient 
injury, while others consider this harm too speculative.  Even after a court has 
found standing, however, plaintiffs still face the challenging task of alleging 
compensable injuries to recover damages.  To avoid encroachment of the 
judiciary into the law-making function of the legislature and the law 
enforcement function of the executive, Congress should adopt comprehensive 
data privacy legislation.  An effective legislative scheme would impose 
national minimum standards for data security procedures and penalties for  
non-compliance.  In addition, the statute would demand notification in all 
instances of data security breach.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly to 
consumers, the statute would permit a limited civil damages recovery to 
plaintiffs who purchased credit monitoring services as a result of the breach in 
security.  Novel issues of law often test the separation of powers between the 
branches of government, and now data privacy should have its place on the 
congressional to-do list. 
 
